John Haldane, ed., MIND, METAPHYSICS, AND VALUE IN THE THOMISTIC AND ANALYTICAL TRADITIONS by Barnes, Gordon
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 8 
1-1-2004 
Haldane, ed., MIND, METAPHYSICS, AND VALUE IN THE 
THOMISTIC AND ANALYTICAL TRADITIONS 
Gordon Barnes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Barnes, Gordon (2004) "Haldane, ed., MIND, METAPHYSICS, AND VALUE IN THE THOMISTIC AND 
ANALYTICAL TRADITIONS," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 21 
: Iss. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss1/8 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions, ed. 
John Haldane. University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. Pp. vii and 215. 
$45.00 (regular price); $36.00 (discount price). 
GORDON BARNES, University of St. Thomas 
The editor of this new collection of essays hopes that it will foster "interac-
tions and exchanges between analytical and scholastic, but especially 
Aristotelian-Thomistic, philosophies" (p.x). This is a welcome change from 
the usual tendency of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophers to limit them-
selves to the interpretation of classical texts. This collection of essays 
abounds in arguments and theories that are well informed by both analyti-
cal and Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. As the title of the volume sug-
gest~" the essays range over topics in the philosophy of mind, action theo-
ry, ontology, and theoretical ethics. In this review I will focus my attention 
on four of these twelve essays. 
Rkhard Cross's paper, "Aquinas and the Mind-Body Problem," is one 
of the most lucid, balanced discussions of Aquinas's philosophy of mind to 
date. After glossing the familiar surface of Aquinas's metaphysical 
thought, Cross quickly descends into the deeper, more difficult questions 
that many Aquinas commentators never ask. He begins with the familiar 
theses of Aquinas's hylomorphism: that "all material substances are com-
posites of prime matter and substantial form" (37); that "a substantial form, 
for Aquinas, is ... that in virtue of which a body has the essential properties 
which it has" (39); and, perhaps more controversially, that a substantial 
form is "something like an instantiated property, or a property instance ... " 
(39). Cross points out that this leaves open the possibility that substantial 
forms, as individualized property-instances, are property-bearers in their 
own right (40). 
All of this sets the stage for Cross's discussion of Aquinas on the human 
soul. Here again, he begins with the familiar. The human soul is the sub-
stantial form of a human body, which is to say that" a human soul is capa-
ble of satisfying, for a human body, all of those conditions which a sub-
stantial form satisfies" (40). Of course, Aquinas also maintains that the 
human soul, unlike any other substantial form, is subsistent, which is to say 
that it "exists in its own right" (40). This is because the human soul has 
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activities-cognition and volition, which are not activities of the body. 
Thus, for Aquinas, 
... a human soul is more than just the substantial form of a human 
body .... On this account, a human soul is an individual with certain 
properties of its own .... [50] whereas 'being the substantial form of a 
f-like body' is the only property had by material substantial forms 
other than the human sout it is not the only property had by a 
human soul. A human soul has two additional properties: capacities 
for cognition and volition" (41). 
From this point forward, Cross's account transcends the usual, tired ren-
ditions of Aquinas's view. Cross concludes that, for Aquinas, a whole 
human being is actually more than just a composite of prime matter and 
substantial form, since a whole human being also includes "that part of the 
soul which, on Aquinas's showing, is not part of the body ... " (43). 
Sometimes Cross states the overall view in mereological terms: one part of 
the human soul is also a part of the form/matter composite that is the 
human body, but another part of the human soul is not part of the 
form/ matter composite that is the human body. Cross is always careful to 
qualify his use of the term "part" with the phrase "in the relevant sense," 
but he often seems to find the language of mereology the most apt for 
expressing Aquinas's view. Such metaphysical candor is a refreshing 
change in Aquinas scholarship. 
Cross thinks that this view is at least prima facie intelligible and coherent. 
He says that liTo show incoherence, we would have to show that a human 
soul could not instantiate the kinds of properties which Aquinas believes it 
to instantiate. I do not see clearly how this could be done" (43). Cross con-
siders two attempts to demonstrate incoherence, and finds them both 
wanting. The first objection is that postulating this part of the soul that is 
not a part of the form/matter composite is incompatible with sort of unity 
that is required for genuine hylomorphic composition. Cross simply 
replies that he finds this claim "debatable." The second objection is 
Anthony Kenny's objection that Aquinas's conception of the human soul is 
ambiguous as between that of an abstraction, and that of a concrete, partic-
ular agent. Cross replies that II Aquinas does not think that an existing sub-
stantial form is an abstract item" (44). 
I believe that Cross has succeeded thus far in defending his Aquinas 
against the charge of incoherence. However, on closer examination of 
Cross's Aquinas, I think that a hybrid of these two objections will re-
appear. Throughout his discussion, Cross moves back and forth between 
the language of properties and the language of parts, sometimes even com-
bining the two in a single statement. The following four statements illus-
trate what I mean. 
" .. . [a substantial form is] something like an instantiated property, or a 
property instance" (39) 
"I think ... that [Aquinas] ought to agree [that a substantial form is a 
set of characteristics]" (51, n12) 
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liThe Thomist claim is that the human soul is a physical property 
which is the subject of non-physical properties" (47). 
" ... part of the human soul is a part of the body. . . .It therefore seems 
to me that we should prefer the claim that a substcmtial form in some 
sense includes, or is (partly) composed of, a body's properties ... " 
(48). 
In these and other statements, Cross tells us that the human soul is: (a) a 
property-instance, (b) a physical property, (c) something that "includes" 
some of the body's properties, and (d) a part of the body, which is "partly 
composed of" a body's properties. Some of this variation can be explained 
by the fact that Cross is sometimes explicating Aquinas, and sometimes 
stating what he thinks Aquinas could and should say. But at the end of the 
day, we have to wonder exactly what the fundamental ontology of Cross's 
Aquinas is supposed to be. 
I suspect that Cross is thinking something like the following. The 
human soul is a particular property-instance, the parts of which are, them-
selves, also property-instances. An example will illustrate the idea. 
Conslder a particular instance of the property being a water molecule. One 
might hold that this property-instance has parts, which are, themselves, 
property-instances. In this case the parts would be particular instances of 
other properties, like being a hydrogen atom and being an oxygen atom, and 
also particular instances of certain relations. In much the same way, 
Cross's Aquinas might hold that the human soul is a certain property-
instance, which is composed of other property-instances-it literally has 
them as parts. Then Cross's Aquinas could say that some of the parts of 
this composite property-instance are instances of physical properties, 
whereas other parts of this composite property-instance are instances of 
non-physical properties. 
Some philosophers will worry that what we have here is simply a bun-
dle theory, according to which a substantial form is merely an aggregate or 
a collection of property-instances. Cross explicitly denies this. In a foot-
note, he says that "Someone accepting the claim that a substantial form is 
a set I)f properties would not, of course, be thereby committed to the claim 
that a substantial form is merely an aggregate of such properties" (51, n12). 
This is not entirely clear. It depends on whether an entity, of whatever 
kind, which is genuinely composite (has parts), is ipso facto identical with 
the sum of its parts. Now, Aristotelian philosophers have long held that 
the answer is "no." A genuinely composite object is not necessarily just the 
sum of its parts. Of course, in defending this answer, Aristotelian philoso-
phers usually appeal to the notion of a substantial form as that which uni-
fies a substance, making it to be something more than merely the sum of its 
parts. However, in this case, it is the very substantial form that is under 
consideration. Is it possible to maintain that substantial forms themselves 
are composites, with proper parts, yet also more than mere aggregates of 
those parts? That is at least one of the questions on which this view ulti-
mately depends. 
In liThe Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind," John 
Haldane argues that "the current situation within analytical philosophy [of 
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mind] is untenable, and [therefore] space needs to be found for a range of 
alternative approaches drawn from non-analytic sources, particularly his-
torical ones" (59). Haldane's indictment comes in two parts. First, he 
points out that many philosophers of mind, in an attempt to distance them-
selves from reductionism, have formulated their physicalism in terms of 
global supervenience. These philosophers restrict their physicalism to the 
meager thesis that there could not be a mental difference without some 
physical difference, somewhere or other in the world. This weakening of the 
physicalist thesis avoids some of the problems that attend more restrictive 
varieties of physicalism, but only at the cost of rendering physicalism 
much harder to motivate. As Haldane puts it, 
"If .. .it is insisted that nothing more is presumed than global varia-
tion then the obvious question to press is why one should believe 
that this is so; why in other words hold on to physicalism when it can 
yield nothing in the way of understanding the existence or character 
of the mental.. .. (61). 
Now, some contemporaries would respond by defending a stronger vari-
ety of physicalism, whether token-physicalism, or even type-physicalism, 
and they would thereby avoid Haldane's objection to mere global superve-
nience. This brings me to the second part of Haldane's indictment. 
In sections IV and V of the paper, Haldane argues that the attempt to 
accomodate perceptual content externalism within the context of a non-reduc-
tive physicalism is ultimately incoherent (63-67). However, this argument 
trades on the assumption that non-reductive physicalism must be under-
stood as the local supervenience of perceptual content on physical states of 
the brain. Now, if that were the only possibility for the non-reductive 
physicalist, then obviously non-reductive physicalism would be incompat-
ible with any sort of content-externalism. However, it is for just this reason 
that the non-reductive phYSicalist is sure to broaden the supervenience 
base of perceptual content to include features of the subject's environment 
that are relevant to fixing the content of her perceptual states, thereby 
including the causal relations between the environment and the neuro-
physiological states of the subject in the supervenience base of perceptual 
content. Then the final picture would look something like this. (Let P rep-
resent a physical state of the environment, c the appropriate causal rela-
tion, P* the neurophysiological effect in the subject, and R the perceptual, 
representational state.) 
t 
R 
t 
P'---,-c'---' 
t 
P* 
According to this view, a certain physical state of the environment is the 
efficient cause of a neurophysiological state of the subject, and both this 
state of the environment and its causal relation to the subject are part of the 
whole supervenience base of the perceptual, representational state of the 
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subject. There is no obvious logical inconsistency here. There would be an 
inconsistency only if we forced the non-reductive physicalist to hold that 
perceptual, representational content supervenes on nothing more than the 
neural state of the subject, but why should the non-reductive physicalist 
have to hold that? The supervenience base for the perceptual, representa-
tional content includes not only the neurophysiological state of the subject, 
but also the fact that this state was caused in the appropriate way by the 
state of the environment that caused it. I do not see any contradiction in 
this overall view. 
Nevertheless, Haldane is clearly right about this much: if the non-
reductive physicalist is to accommodate content externalism, then she 
must expand the supervenience base of perceptual states to include the 
environment of the subject. This is certainly a step away from the tidiness 
of local supervenience, and towards a mere global supervenience, in which 
case Haldane's complaints about the motivations for holding to mere glob-
al supervenience are still to the point. Perhaps this a lone is enough to vin-
dicate his call to re-open the books on historical alternatives to the current 
paradigm. 
In "The Active and Potential Intellects: Aquinas as a Philosopher in His 
Own Right," David Braine expounds Aquinas's account of the intellect, con-
trasting it with both Platonist and empiricist alternatives. According to 
Braine, Aquinas identifies our capacity to use general concepts with the 
intellect's possession of the relevant "intellectual species" (22). These intel-
lectual species make possible "all applications of general concepts express-
ible in linguistic form" (25). They also make possible "judgments of what 
arises simply from the meaning of the general term or predicate concerned, 
or from what belongs to the general nature of the kind of thing being con-
sidered, ... , such as go beyond anything straightforwardly perceptual" (26). 
In short, the intellectual species make possible the possession and use of 
general concepts, and also all judgments that outrun mere sense perception. 
In contrast with Platonism, Braine insists that, for Aquinas, 
.. . ~;pecies are never actual or real objects. Their existence in the intel-
lect consists in the intellect's thereby having the means of under-
standing real things of a certain kind, e.g. in the case of the intellectu-
al species of a cow the means of understanding the nature of cows as 
cows (24). 
At this point one begins to wonder if Aquinas's intellectual species are 
doing any real theoretical work here. Intellectual species were introduced 
to explain the intellect's capacity for the application of general concepts, 
and its capacity for knowledge that transcends sense-perception. The idea 
seemed to be that if we accept a bit of ontology-the existence of intellectu-
al species, then we can explain our capacity to apply general concepts, and 
make universal judgments that transcend sense-perception. However, 
then Braine tells us that the existence of intellectual species really amounts 
to nothing more than this very capacity to understand things of a certain 
kind as things of that kind. So, in the end, it looks as if the intellectual 
species are defined in terms of the very capacity that they were introduced 
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to explain, in which case they do not provide an explanation of general 
concept application at all, but only a place-holder for such an explanation. 
In his elaboration of Aquinas's theory, Braine turns to Aquinas's 
account of sense-perception, and especially vision. Braine asks us to con-
sider a case in which someone is looking at the roof of a house through a 
clean, colorless window pane. 
The light which comes to us by reflection off the roof that we see is 
configured in a certain way, both in each stage of its passing through 
the air, in the window pane, in the air between us and the window 
pane, and in the pupil. Plainly, our perception of the roof depends 
on this configuration at each stage having some sort of isomorphism 
('sameness of form') with the roof relevant to this perception. (30) 
Here we get more information about the nature of intelligible species, 
through an analogy with Aquinas's theory of sense perception, and the 
corresponding sensible species. What Braine suggests is that an intelligible 
species is a configuration that is somehow isomorphic with that which it repre-
Setzts. This is at least the beginning of a genuine theory, but it is only the 
very beginning. There are many questions left unanswered. Hopefully 
Thomistic theorists will continue to develop this line of thought in more 
detail. Only then will it be possible to assess it fully. 
In UHylomorphism and Individuation," David Oderberg examines the 
scholastic doctrine that designated matter is the principle of individuation of 
complete material substances. After canvassing the most salient scholastic 
alternatives to this view, Oderberg carefully works out the details of the 
view. Designated matter is matter possessing indeterminate quantity 
(130). Indeterminate quantity is understood as "whatever range of definite 
quantities, prescribed by the form itself, a substance happens to have" 
(135). Oderberg's idea is that what individuates a material substance is not 
its determinate quantity at one particular time, but rather all the quantities 
and spatial locations of its matter at all the times at which it exists. No 
other individual has exactly the same determinate quantities, in exactly the 
same places, at exactly the same times. Thus, Oderberg says that "Socrates 
and Callias might share their matter, and they might even do so in the 
same place; but it will not be at the same time" (134). 
One obvious worry here is that this principle of individuation will make 
the individuality of material substances logically contingent. Although 
Socrates and Calli as do not share the same quantities of matter at the very 
same places and the very same times, surely the material quantities, loca-
tions, and times that are unique to them could have been reversed. It is logi-
cally possible, one might suggest, that Socrates' matter have had the very 
dimensional quantities, at the very same spatial locations, and at the very 
same times, as Callias actually has, and vice versa. In that case, Oderberg's 
principle of individuation implies that the very individualities of Socrates 
and Callias would have been reversed, but surely that is impossible. 
Oderberg seems to be aware of this objection. In response, he contends 
that the principle of individuality and the principle of identity need not be 
the same (136). What he is suggesting, as far as I can tell, is that what indi-
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viduates a material substance need not be that which determines its identi-
ty over time and possibilities as well. What Oderberg is offering us is 
merely a principle of individuation, not a principle of identity. It is not 
entirely clear to me that this separation of the principle of individuality 
from the principle of identity is coherent. 
Here is a simple argument. To say that something is an individual is to 
say that it is exactly one thing. It is to say that it has unity or oneness. Thus, 
the question "Is this an individual?" is fundamentally the question "How 
many things are there here? One or many?" Consequently, the question 
"What makes this thing to be an individual?" is logically equivalent to the 
question "What makes it the case that there is exactly one thing here?" 
Thus, the principle of individuation is supposed to answer this question of 
"how many?" Now, if the principle of individuation answers this question 
of one or many, at a certain place, at a certain time, then one might expect 
the same principle to answer the same question of one or many over time 
and across possibilities. If so, then the principle of individuation for a materi-
al substance should also serve as a principle of identity for that substance 
across time and possibilities. For this reason, I am not certain that matter 
possE'ssing indeterminate quantity could serve as the principle of individu-
ation, since it fails as a principle of identity across time and possibilities. 
The Divine Attributes, by Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002. Pp. 204. $62.95. $26.95 (paper). 
PAUL K. MOSER, Loyola University of Chicago 
This book, complete with a glossary of technical terms, offers a remarkably 
lucid exposition of the idea of God as a maximally great being. At times the 
authors shift from talk of idea to talk of nature. They thus identify their 
main purpose as giving "a rational account of the nature of God, that is, of 
the God of the three major Western religions of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam" (p. 3). Caution is in order here, given a common use of "the nature 
of X" in ordinary language. If God must exist in order for there to be "the 
nature of God," the authors' stated purpose must be reformulated. The 
authors, however, do not use "the nature of God" in a way that has exis-
tential import regarding God. Their talk of "defining the nature of God" is 
synonymous with their talk of "defining the idea, or the concept, of God" 
(cf. p. 4). The authors thus do not begin with the assumption that God 
exists. On the contrary, the book concludes with some doubts about ratio-
nal belief that God exists. 
What do the authors mean by "a rational account of the nature of God"? 
They do not mean "an account indicating that commitment to the reality of 
God's nature is epistemically rational." They focus instead on an account 
indicating that the concept of God as a maximally great being is "coherent" 
(p. 6) Given that "rational" is ordinarily used to connote an epistemic sta-
tus exceeding logical and conceptual coherence, it may have been more 
straightforward for the authors to talk instead of a logically and conceptually 
coherent account of the concept of God. They mainly seek consistency in the 
